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Abstract. Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 prompted a major European crisis.
This article applies the main theories of foreign policy analysis to the British Government’s
handling of this crisis. It argues that bureaucratic politics existed, but had little impact on
outcomes. Domestic politics had more influence, but did not provide detailed instructions on
how to act. The perceptions of key actors, informed by reasoned judgement, determined
this. Fears of the threat posed by rival states coalesced with concerns about Britain’s own
military weakness, leading decision-makers to emphasise the need to act in tandem with
France. British policy was therefore motivated by the tension between the public’s desire to
see action against Italy and the Government’s wish to minimise any breach with her allies.
These findings highlight the weaknesses of the bureaucratic politics model and show how
domestic politics can aﬀect foreign policy outcomes. They also demonstrate the interaction
between rational analysis defined in terms of reasoned judgement, and actors’ perceptions.
It is thus argued that benefits are to be gleaned from combining these theories.
Andrew Holt is currently a University Teacher in the Department of Politics, History and
International Relations, Loughborough University. He received his PhD from The Univer-
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On 3 October 1935, Italian troops marched into the East African state of Abyssinia
(now known as Ethiopia). This was not Italy’s first attempt to seize control of the
country. An earlier endeavour ended with defeat at Adowa on 1 March 1896,
leaving what the Italian nationalist poet Gabriele D’Annunzio described as a
‘shameful scar’ on the recently unified nation.1 Benito Mussolini, Fascist Dictator
of Italy from 1922, was determined to avenge this perceived humiliation. After a
skirmish at Wal-Wal on the border between Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland in
December 1934, he seized his opportunity In the process, Mussolini plunged
Europe into crisis. Britain’s interest in Abyssinia was limited. She required the
safety of Lake Tsana’s headwaters – its tributary the Blue Nile was an important
river for the British colony of Sudan – and there was also some concern that an
Italian conquest could damage trade. Nevertheless, British policymakers, encour-
aged by their French counterparts, prioritised maintaining friendly relations with
Italy as a means of presenting a unified front against German revisionism.2
Unfortunately for Britain, Italian demands forced Abyssinia to appeal to the
1 Quoted in Norman Rose, Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat (London: Heinemann, 1978), p. 156.
2 See ‘The Maﬀey Report’, Documents on British Foreign Policy [hereafter DBFP], Vol. XIV, Appendix
II (18 June 1935).
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League of Nations. Thus, when the League declared the Italian invasion to be an
act of aggression, Britain and France, as the organisation’s leading members, faced
a dilemma: to betray League principles or to alienate a valuable continental ally.
The policy that emerged from this impasse pleased no one. The League imposed
sanctions on Italy, but the exclusion of restrictions on oil rendered them largely
ineﬀectual. The British Cabinet, meanwhile, vacillated. With a General Election
called for 14 November 1935, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin spoke of his support
for the League. In December, however, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Foreign Secretary,
stopped oﬀ in Paris en route to a much-needed holiday in Switzerland. The
solution that emerged from these talks, proposed in conjunction with French
Premier Pierre Laval, put two thirds of Abyssinia under Italian control – seemingly
more than she had yet conquered. The Cabinet approved the plan, then, in the face
of a public outcry, repudiated it, forcing Hoare’s resignation.
According to A. J. P. Taylor, ‘No one knows why the British government took
the line they did; probably they did not know themselves’.3 This article endeavours
to explain why. Drawing from the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA), it assesses
the relative influence of bureaucratic politics, domestic politics and psychological
factors on decision-makers, focusing on attitudes to the key issues of sanctions and
the Hoare-Laval Plan. The major decision-makers receive particular attention. In
June 1935, Baldwin became Prime Minister for the third time – though he was the
eﬀective leader of the Government before then – whilst Hoare replaced Sir John
Simon as Foreign Secretary. The young Anthony Eden was a Foreign Oﬃce (FO)
minister, latterly as Minister for League of Nations Aﬀairs with a Cabinet seat.
The views of the Cabinet as a whole also merit examination, as do those held by
prominent civil servants within the Foreign Oﬃce. Given his dominance, this is
especially true of Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary.
The Abyssinian Crisis provides an excellent opportunity test the strengths and
weaknesses of the main branches of foreign policy analysis theory. Theorists often
tend to focus on more recent events, but using an example from the 1930s allows
for greater historical perspective and provides the benefit of readily available
documentary evidence. Contemporary policymakers recognised the Abyssinian
issue as being of the utmost importance. Indeed, critics such as Eden regarded the
attempts to pacify Italy as one of the first acts of ‘appeasement’, with some holding
the view that a strong line against Mussolini could have discouraged later German
aggression and therefore even prevented World War II. The nature of the crisis
itself also makes it eminently suitable as a case study. As policy developed over a
relatively long period of time, it possible to see how preferences evolved. Two
specific features make it especially interesting. Vansittart was an extremely
powerful civil servant who had strong, well-defined views, making an analysis of
the role of the bureaucracy particularly relevant. In addition, the British public
took a keen interest in the crisis and Baldwin’s decision to hold an election as
events reached their crescendo enhanced the importance of popular opinion.
Before the article addresses the above issues, an introductory analysis of the
FPA literature is necessary. The rational actor, bureaucratic politics and psycho-
logical approaches all contain useful insights, but also serious defects. It is better
therefore to use them in concert. The following section builds on these theories in
3 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, new edition (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 121.
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order to determine the primary influences on British foreign policy in the 1930s. It
argues that although domestic political factors influenced policymakers, the main
actors deciding policy were certain key oﬃce holders and top FO oﬃcials. Having
established this, the article then focuses on how British policy emerged with
reference to these theories. Bureaucratic politics is examined first. It shows that
while bureaucratic politics did exist within the British policymaking machine, it had
little influence on outcomes. The article then goes on to analyse domestic politics,
finding that despite its contradictions, public opinion encouraged the Government
to act against Italy when it might otherwise not have done so, and forced it to
repudiate the Hoare-Laval Plan. Finally, psychological influences and perceptions
of other actors are considered, revealing that perception combined with rational
analysis of intentions and threats, led to a reliance on French support. The
conclusion assesses the implications of these findings for the aforementioned FPA
theories.
Foreign policy analysis
Although individuals or small groups of ministers and oﬃcials are usually
responsible for decision-making, there are many complex influences upon them. In
explaining these influences, the rational actor model predominated for many years.
Changes in FPA began in the 1970s with the emergence of two new approaches.
The first of these concentrated on structural influences on policymakers. Graham
T. Allison initially put forward two alternative models – organisational processes
and bureaucratic politics – whilst others emphasise the importance of public
opinion. The second approach examined the psychology of decision-makers. Irving
Janis produced a study showing how ‘groupthink’ can occur. In contrast, Robert
Jervis focused on perception. From this group of psychology-based theories,
history as an influence on decision-makers spawned its own literature.
The traditional approach to FPA is the rational actor model. This assumes that
an action represents a rational, value maximising choice. However, it over-
simplifies the decision-making process by failing to account for the potential for
conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the state.4 Martin
Hollis and Steve Smith thus put forward a more relevant definition of rationality
based on reasoned judgement rather than actors pursuing unquestioned aims.5 A
second criticism, that as emotional beings, people find it impossible to ignore
completely their values, wishes and beliefs, is more diﬃcult to overcome.6 Finally,
the model also neglects the impact of organisations on decision-makers.
4 Jeremy L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 15.
5 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making’, British
Journal of Political Science, 16:3 (1986), p. 283. See also, Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 14–5,
236, 357, 361.
6 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons’, p. 278; Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The
Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 101–3, 107;
Thomas M. Mongar, ‘Personality and Decision-Making: John F. Kennedy in Four Crisis Decisions’,
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 2:2 (1969), p. 225.
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Graham Allison’s work marked a breakthrough in FPA. His organisational
processes model, later renamed organisational behaviour, holds that standard rules
and procedures limit available choices and determine the actions of a government.7
Information reaches decision-makers via a series of intermediaries enabling
distortion to occur en route, with bureaucrats able to structure issues to elicit the
desired response from decision-makers.8 Allison’s more famous bureaucratic
politics model, later endorsed by Morton Halperin, contends that outcomes result
from bargaining between leaders and organisations. The bureaucratic position of a
decision-maker shapes their goals and actors’ relative political weights can be
decisive.9 This model contains serious flaws. First, positions do not determine all
disagreements even in Allison’s chosen case of the Cuban Missile Crisis.10
Similarly, people can hold numerous roles as well as oﬃcial positions, potentially
leading to conflict between them. The model also underestimates the importance of
the individual actor, especially leaders, and falsely assumes that departmental
interests are obvious. Moreover, the organisational perspective becomes less
important in a crisis, when non-routine issues are involved. Governments tend to
behave as unitary actors in such situations.11 Finally, Allison based his models
entirely on the American policymaking system. The diﬀerences between bureau-
cratic structures thus further weaken the general explanatory power of the models.
Public opinion is a more widely applicable structural variable. There has been
a traditional acceptance of the primacy of domestic circumstances, whereby the
desire to retain power dominates decisions.12 More recent research has challenged
this, however. For example, a study by Thomas Risse-Kappen found that leaders
often make decisions without public support. Although the extent to which the
mass (as opposed to ‘attentive’) public is interested in foreign aﬀairs is often
under-rated, domestic issues remain more important to most people.13 The key
factor, therefore, is the level of public passion about a particular issue, which is
likely to increase in a crisis.
7 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd
edition (New York: Longman, 1971), pp. 164–5.
8 Joseph Frankel, ‘Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy’, Political Studies, 7:1 (1959),
p. 8; Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1974), p. 116. See also, Zeev Maoz, ‘Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation
of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings’, World Politics, 43:1 (1990), pp. 77–110.
9 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 256–8; Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, p. 99.
10 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 26–7; Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons’, p. 283. See also, Edward Rhodes, ‘Do
Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the US Navy’, World
Politics, 47:2 (1994), pp. 30, 32, 39.
11 Hollis and Smith, ‘Roles and Reasons’, pp. 275–7; Jonathan Bendor, and Thomas H. Hammond,
‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, American Political Science Review, 86:2 (1992), p. 315; Lebow,
Between Peace and War, pp. 155–6; Jeﬀrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich,
Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force From Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 2002), p. 2; Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 253.
12 Frankel, ‘Towards a Decision-Making Model’, p. 5; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 387. See
also, Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 305.
13 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal
Democracies’, World Politics, 43:4 (1991), pp. 480–1; James Barber, Who Makes British Foreign
Policy? (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976), pp. 7–8; David Vital, The Making of British
Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin 1968), pp. 72–5. Cf. William Wallace, The Foreign Policy
Process in Britain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 88.
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The second line of attack on the rational actor paradigm emanates from
psychological research. Irving Janis found that within a group, cohesiveness can
cause greater adherence to group norms, with groups more prone to risk taking
and the dehumanising stereotyping of rivals.14 Janis’s analysis is persuasive, though
it negates the impact of conflicting personal interests and of dominant personali-
ties. The most salient work in this area, however, looks at the individual
policymaker. Robert Jervis and Ole R. Holsti both note the importance of
perceptions. Actors base their behaviour on how they think others will act.15
Misperception is most common in predicting intentions, where relevant data is
harder to acquire. Mirror imaging, assuming an adversary will act identically to
how you yourself would act if in the same position, can influence this. National
self-images can also aﬀect policy outcomes, with policymakers feeling that they
must act in accordance with their country’s reputation and values. Furthermore,
individual experience and belief systems can influence judgements.16 There is no
agreement on how perceptions form. Whilst Richard Ned Lebow, and Janis and
Leon Mann hold that people see what they want to see (the motivational
hypothesis), Jervis argues that people see what they expect.17 Given the evidence
in support of both hypotheses, it is likely that each applies in diﬀerent
circumstances. Psychological approaches are diﬃcult to criticise on the theoretical
level – they require research to substantiate or disprove them – yet they struggle
to explain the frequency with which misperception is likely to occur.
History, one particular influence on perception, has generated a literature of its
own. Policymakers often use it to reinforce a chosen course of action, though but
it can shape views too.18 In general, history has promoted poor reasoning.
Analogies associated with disasters have the most impact and decision-makers
often fail to consider a suﬃciently wide range of comparative examples. In
addition, the lessons learned are often superficial and over-generalised. Neverthe-
less, Jeﬀrey Record plays down the impact of history, noting that ‘Analogies
influence, but do not dictate, decisions’.19
No one perspective alone can provide a satisfactory explanation of policy-
making. All have distinct strengths and weaknesses. The rational-actor model
remains powerful if considered in terms of reasoned judgement, but is too
simplistic to use alone. Most are too insular – focusing on one particular influence
at the expense of others. This is most prevalent in Allison’s work, which
14 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston:
Houghton Miﬄin, 1982), pp. 3–5.
15 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 32, 68; Ole R. Holsti, ‘Individual Diﬀerences in “Definition
of the Situation”’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14:3 (1970), pp. 303–34.
16 Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy, p. 268; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 195–202; Steve Smith,
‘Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations’, in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds),
Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 12; Jervis,
Perception and Misperception, p. 187.
17 Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 224–8; Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A
Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); Jervis,
Perception and Misperception, p. 406. See also, pp. 369–72, 380; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R.
May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1986),
p. 235.
18 Record, Making War, Thinking History, p. 3; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 17.
19 Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. ix–xii; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, pp. 271,
281–2; Record, Making War, Thinking History, pp. 129, 155–6, 164.
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overemphasises bureaucratic procedures and oﬃcial positions. Allison’s models
also understate the influence of the actor and are diﬃcult to apply to systems
outside Washington, weakening their explanatory power. The impact of the public
varies depending on their interest in the issue, whilst ‘groupthink’ and especially
actors’ perceptions can also be crucial. The past, too, can influence decision-
makers, but is singly insuﬃcient for action. A combination of these approaches
should thus yield better results, making assessing the relative bearing of each factor
the key diﬃculty.20 This is likely to vary across countries, as systems, values and
experiences diﬀer. Before analysing the Abyssinian Crisis using the insights
provided by these theories, an examination the British foreign policymaking system
is therefore necessary.
Foreign policymaking in Britain
Britain had a worldwide network of interests in the 1930s. Her foreign policymaking
process was ‘perhaps more complex than any other European power’.21 Although
the Foreign Oﬃce was formally responsible handling this complexity, a number of
actors were involved in the shaping of British foreign policy. There are four schools
that contest which were most influential. The pluralist and public control perspec-
tives focus on the role of the public and pressure groups respectively. A third
approach considers formal oﬃce holders, whilst, finally, the departmental negoti-
ated order school considers other departments and civil servants. Each of these
approaches provides some insight into the making of British foreign policy.
The first two approaches emphasise the influence of the public, both indirect
and direct. The pluralist perspective concentrates on political parties and pressure
groups. Political parties had only limited influence in the mid-1930s. They
contained splits, whilst the National Government was particularly strong. The
influence of Parliament in foreign aﬀairs is also usually slight.22 On the other hand,
there were a large number of foreign policy pressure groups Britain. The League
of Nations Union, for example, had 500,000 members. Despite this however, their
opportunities to influence policy were limited, as much was decided within the
Foreign Oﬃce. Pressure groups thus exerted influence only as an expression of
public opinion. The public control perspective attributes greatest significance to
public opinion directly.23 William Wallace argues that ‘no government can aﬀord
to ignore the domestic context of foreign policy’ and the impending election forced
the Government to pay particular attention to public opinion.24 Nevertheless,
although significant, public opinion did not prescribe detailed policy and was but
one influence on policymakers in 1935.
20 Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 102; Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 28.
21 Hines H. Hall, III, ‘The Foreign Policy-Making Process in Britain, 1934–1935, and the Origins of
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement’, Historical Journal, 19:2 (1976), p. 478.
22 Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 64–5; Vital, British Foreign Policy, p. 48; Zara
Steiner, ‘Decision-Making in American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut Case’, Review
of International Studies, 13:1 (1987), p. 16.
23 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 113; Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, p. 90.
24 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 88. See also, Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 94,
97.
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By focusing on the key policymakers, the formal oﬃce holder perspective is
more relevant to this period. It assumes the dominance of certain key ministers,
particularly the Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Secretaries, and holds that
their goals determine policy outcomes. In line with Jervis’s arguments, it emphasises
the importance of their perceptions and experiences.25 During the crisis, Hoare
acted as an originator of policy, rather than representative of the Cabinet (though
the Foreign Secretary’s relationship with the Prime Minister is crucial in determi-
ning his role). Contrary to Allison, this approach denigrates the role of civil
servants because they lack the authority to act without ministerial approval.26 It has
two main weaknesses. First, it relies too heavily on the disinterestedness of public
opinion and other ministers. Whilst this may apply in more routine situations, it
does not in relation to strategic dilemmas and other salient matters.27 Indeed, the
Peace Ballot demonstrates public involvement, whilst the Cabinet was instrumental
repudiating the Hoare-Laval Plan. The approach’s second weakness lies in giving
too little attention to how civil servants can exercise influence, if not formal power.
The departmental negotiated order perspective addresses this. Closely resem-
bling the bureaucratic politics model, it emphasises the bargaining that occurs
between departments.28 The Treasury’s control over expenditure allowed it to wield
the most influence over the Foreign Oﬃce, and its power peaked in the 1930s.29
Although the FO usually opposed external suggestions, crisis ‘homogenises opinion
and pulverises dissent’, and can disturb established procedures, diminishing the
relevance of bargaining.30 This departmental negotiated order approach also notes
the important role played by civil servants. An oﬃcial can impose his view on a
department by force of personality, with some oﬃcials carrying more weight than
ministers.31 Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky argue that ‘oﬃcials will initially go
along with an astonishing range of nonsense’, yet the FO enjoys a reputation for
imposing its views on its political chiefs.32 Though the assertion that ‘the experts
were on top, rather than on tap’ goes too far, civil servants were very powerful in
the 1930s. When structures became less controlling as in matters of high politics,
they could exploit their personal relationships with ministers.33
The departmental negotiated order perspective is thus the most relevant in
identifying the key actors in British foreign policymaking. The pluralist and public
control perspectives both exaggerate the role of the public, while the formal oﬃce
25 Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, p. 18.
26 D. C. Watt, ‘Divided Control of British Foreign Policy – Danger or Necessity?’, Political Quarterly,
33:4 (1962), pp. 373–4; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 46; Steiner, ‘Decision-Making’, p. 3. See
also, Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 7–9.
27 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 13. See also, Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 7–8,
22, 26.
28 Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 34–5.
29 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. 40–1; Vital, British Foreign Policy, pp. 57, 89; David Reynolds,
Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, 2nd edition (Harlow:
Longman, 2000), p. 45; Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public
Money: Community and Policy Inside British Politics, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 203.
30 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Fontana, 1990), p. 78; Heclo and Wildavsky, Private
Government, p. 162; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 74.
31 Barbar, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, pp. 52, 60; Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, p. 10.
32 Heclo and Wildavsky, Private Government, p. 379. See also, Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), p. 124.
33 Wallace, Foreign Policy Process, pp. 22, 51; J. A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare: A Political Biography
(London: Cape, 1977), p. 188.
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holders approach understates the importance of oﬃcials. This conclusion needs to
be qualified in two ways, however. First, much of the aforementioned literature
appeared in the 1970s and thereafter. This creates problems in applying its
arguments to a period during which FO oﬃcials had diﬀerent attitudes and were
more socially homogeneous and specialised. Moreover, insights from the other
three schools are also valuable. Pressure groups and the public could aﬀect the
foreign policymaking process, but only at certain times. Even then, their influence
was not decisive. It is also important to remember that political oﬃce holders, not
civil servants, made the major decisions. Thus, to endorse the departmental
negotiated order approach to identifying the most important actors in foreign
policymaking is not, therefore, to support the claims of bureaucratic politics model
in relation to the Abyssinian Crisis.
Bureaucratic politics
If the bureaucratic politics model is accurate in relation to the crisis, two features
should be observable. First, the approach expects departmental interest to shape
actors’ views, with ministers sharing the opinions of their oﬃcials. Moreover,
bargaining within the Cabinet should be apparent and the most powerful ministers
should have their wishes translated into policy outcomes. In order to assess
whether this was the case a number of groups need to be considered. Ambassadors
could be expected to be sympathetic to their respective base countries, whilst the
preferences of government ministries should follow their own particular interests.
These ministries include the Foreign Oﬃce and its geographical departments, the
Colonial Oﬃce, the Board of Trade and the Treasury. Finally, the military, and
especially the Navy, also had one particular interest: the avoidance of overstretch-
ing their resources.
The two key British ambassadors tended to sympathise with their countries of
residence. As the organisational processes model predicts, their dispatches shaped
issues to further their causes. Sir Sydney Barton’s telegrams from Addis Ababa
demonstrate considerable backing for the Abyssinian cause.34 However, Barton’s
posting to a strategically unimportant country illustrates his relative lack of
prestige within the Diplomatic Service. Although Hoare expressed confidence in
him, there is little evidence that Barton’s views influenced policy. Despite being a
former League of Nations Secretary-General and holding a prime job at Rome, Sir
Eric Drummond carried little more weight. The British Embassy in Italy wanted
the tension to decrease, and Drummond showed some sympathy with Mussolini.
However, instead of messages of confidence, Drummond complained more than
once that the FO was not keeping him fully informed.35
34 See Barton to Simon, DBFP, XIV, No. 163 (19 February 1935); Barton to Simon, British Documents
on Foreign Aﬀairs [hereafter BDFA], Series G, Vol. XXVIII, Doc. 132 (20 February 1935); Barton
to Simon, DBFP, XIV, No. 217 (26 March 1935); Barton to Hoare, BDFA, G, XXIX, Doc. 15 (30
June 1935).
35 Hoare to Barton, DBFP, XIV, No. 474 (20 August 1935); Drummond to Hoare, BDFA, G, XXIX,
Doc. 6 (I June 1935); Drummond to Vansittart, DBFP, XIV, No. 56 (22 December 1934);
Drummond to Hoare, DBFP, XV, No. 60 (10 October 1935).
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There were similar position-influenced patterns in the relationships within and
between government departments. The FO’s Egyptian Department was concerned
specifically about the impact on British prestige in Egypt and Sudan of an Italian
conquest in Abyssinia and was more anti-Italian.36 Similarly, Vansittart admitted
that the Colonial Oﬃce’s ‘local point of view’ partly justified its hostility to Italy.37
On the economic side, President of the Board of Trade Walter Runciman opposed
oﬀering Italy access to Abyssinian raw materials and consistently resisted sanctions
because of their negative impact on the British economy.38 The most influential
department outside the Foreign Oﬃce, however, was the Treasury. Neville
Chamberlain and his department’s ‘rigidly orthodox economic theories’ guided the
Government, and the state of the economy severely restricted the options avail-
able to policymakers. Moreover, although Vansittart fought his own corner,
Chamberlain’s abilities and standing enabled him to win support in Cabinet for his
views.39 The Treasury thus exercised considerable influence over defence spending
and compromise between the FO, Treasury and the service ministries contributed
to the muddled nature of British policy.
While the Treasury’s influence remained constant, that of military advisers
increased as the crisis developed. They consistently opposed action against Italy. In
the first instance, personal values played a part in this. The majority of generals
and admirals were conservative. They admired Mussolini and were hostile to the
League.40 Moreover, as the imposition of economic sanctions risked war with Italy
and a quarrel with the US, the Navy’s opposition ‘was not surprising’.41 The
Admiralty also had strong concerns about Germany as shown by their continuing
pressure for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (concluded on 18 June 1935),
and were thus especially reluctant to contemplate action without French support.42
These views carried weight. The qualities of Sir Ernle Chatfield, the First Sea Lord,
dwarfed those of his counterparts in the RAF and Army and his views on strategic
matters were highly regarded. He dominated the Board of the Admiralty, including
his political chief Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty.
Eyres-Monsell’s own naval background would have inclined him towards defer-
ence, whilst he enjoyed a longstanding friendship with the Prime Minister. Finally,
although the Great War weakened the Navy, its glorious history still gave it a
privileged position. Ultimately both Eyres-Monsell and the Air Minister, Sir Philip
36 Memorandum by Campbell, DBFP, XIV, Appendix III (9 August 1935). See also, Barton to Hoare,
BDFA, XXIX, Doc. 15; Draft memorandum by Jebb for the Dominions, J 3584/1/1, FO 371/19123,
The National Archives, Kew, Richmond upon Thames, London [hereafter TNA] (2 August 1935).
37 Vansittart to Drummond, quoted in DBFP, XIV, No. 59 (28 December 1934), note 2.
38 Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, Collins 1954), p. 166; note by Oliphant,
DBFP, XIV, No. 490 (20 August 1935); Chamberlain diary (29 November 1935), quoted in Iain
Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (London: Muller, 1961), p. 188; Cross, Hoare, p. 236.
39 Hall, ‘Foreign Policy-Making Process’, pp. 480, 484.
40 Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 125.
41 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969),
pp. 876–7.
42 Lord Vansittart, The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart (London: Hutchinson,
1958), p. 525, Hall, ‘Foreign Policy-Making Process’, pp. 477, 499; Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian
Crisis (London: Batsford, 1974), p. 156; Chatfield to Vansittart, DBFP, XIV, No. 431 (8 August
1935); Chatfield to Fisher (25 August 1935), quoted in Arthur Marder, ‘The Royal Navy and the
Ethiopian Crisis’, American Historical Review, 75:5 (1970), pp. 1330–1; R. A. C. Parker, ‘Britain,
France and the Abyssinian Crisis’, English Historical Review, 89:361 (1974), p. 319.
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Cunliﬀe-Lister (created Viscount Swinton after the election), followed the opposi-
tion of their advisers.43 Minutes of the Cabinet and the Defence Policy Require-
ments Sub-Committee also highlight the salience of military and especially naval
factors to decision-makers.
In 1935, the Foreign Oﬃce contained eight geographical departments, each with
its own head. Above them in the hierarchy were four Assistant Under-Secretaries,
and the Deputy and Permanent Under-Secretaries. Sir Robert Vansittart was the
most influential oﬃcial. He was ‘a Germanophobe of the first water’ and
subjugated all else to the aim of preventing renewed German aggression.44
However, contrary to the bureaucratic politics model, there is little reason for his
position to have influenced him in this way; it was simply his view that the greatest
threat to British security emanated from across the North Sea. Vansittart exerted
significant influence on both Hoare and his immediate predecessor as Foreign
Secretary, Sir John Simon.45 Poor health adversely aﬀected Hoare’s judgement,
whilst the divisions within the FO and Vansittart’s own forceful personality also
aided the Permanent Under-Secretary in getting his way.46 Preferring to focus on
the threat posed by Germany, Vansittart opposed sanctions. His wish to ‘buy
oﬀ’ Italy prevailed despite the opposition of Eden and other members of the FO
and he instigated the Zeila proposals, which involved surrendering British territory
to Italy as a means to a settlement.47 Vansittart’s power peaked with the
Hoare-Laval Pact, for which the press and Chancellor Neville Chamberlain held
him responsible.48
There is evidence of bureaucratic politics within the Cabinet. The relative
political standing of the two incumbents at the Foreign Oﬃce did make a diﬀerence
to policymaking. Simon’s prestige was low, but Hoare enjoyed the Cabinet’s
confidence. The Cabinet neither granted nor denied Hoare the authority to
conclude the Paris agreement, but approved it nonetheless. Baldwin’s lack of
interest in foreign aﬀairs as Prime Minister strengthened Hoare further and the
‘inner’ Cabinet (Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare and
Eden) took the decision to introduce sanctions, illustrating how prestige correlates
with influence. However, the Foreign Secretary’s perceptions and views were more
important. This was especially so with Hoare, whose talents and experience at the
43 Marder, ‘Royal Navy’, pp. 1336–7; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 553. Hardie, Abyssinian
Crisis, pp. 150, 155; Cross, Hoare, p. 236.
44 Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 85. See also, Jennings, Cabinet Government, p. 127.
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(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p. 147; Cross, Hoare, p. 201; David Dutton, Anthony
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Rose, Vansittart, p. 164; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 138; D. R. Thorpe, Eden: The Life
and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897–1977 (London: Chatto and Windus, 2003),
p. 157.
46 Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 303; Cross, Hoare, p. 264. See also, Templewood, Nine Troubled
Years, pp. 178, 191; Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 137–8.
47 Note by Vansittart to Hoare and Eden, BDFP, XV, No. 251 (23 November 1935); minutes by
O’Malley and Vansittart, J 2389/1/1, FO 371/19112, TNA (3 June 1965); Dutton, Anthony Eden,
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India Oﬃce inclined him to work towards an administrative solution, whilst
Vansittart pushed him towards appeasing Italy. Had Eden been Foreign Secretary,
it is highly unlikely that he would have made a similar deal.49
Thus, personalities and perceptions of oﬃce holders emerge as being more
influential on policy outcomes than their positions. This supports psychological
approaches to FPA over the bureaucratic politics model. There is plenty of
evidence that bureaucratic politics existed, but less that it aﬀected outcomes.
Ambassadors were sympathetic to their respective base countries, yet carried no
real weight with decision-makers. The reactions of Foreign Oﬃce departments, the
Colonial Oﬃce and the Board of Trade all tallied with expectations, but did not
alter British policy either. The Treasury had more bearing. Vansittart also
influenced policy, but his position did not shape his outlook. Similarly, whilst there
was bargaining in the Cabinet, the personality, outlook and health of the Foreign
Secretary were more important. However, the key place where the bureaucratic
politics model falls down is in the case of the most powerful department, the
Foreign Oﬃce. Departmental interest influenced Chatfield as First Sea Lord, but
not Vansittart or Hoare. The Admiralty’s goal was to ensure that the Royal Navy
remained able to defend Britain and the Empire against external strategic threats.
The Italian action against Abyssinia posed little direct danger to Britain, and the
Admiralty was therefore reluctant to sacrifice ships to that cause. However, the role
of the Foreign Oﬃce as a whole was to protect British security and interests. Eden
considered that strong action against Italy via the League would best serve these
interests; Vansittart and Hoare disagreed. This shows that departmental objectives
do not always clearly prescribe action as Allison assumes. Individual actors must
make decisions while trying to meet their targets. Nevertheless, the bureaucracy
overall was generally unenthusiastic about action against Italy. Britain may well
have stood aside were it not for the public outcry.
Domestic politics and public opinion
Domestic politics did more to influence decision-makers and policy outcomes than
bureaucratic politics. In order to assess the full impact of these factors, two main
tests must be applied. If the model is applicable, it needs to be shown that
Parliament, comprised of elected representatives of the people, influenced policy-
making. Closely linked to this are concerns about party politics. Second and most
importantly, it is necessary to analyse how policymakers reacted to public opinion,
especially on the key issues of the possibility of war, the League of Nations and
the Hoare-Laval Plan itself. This is easier to ascertain than the impact of
bureaucratic positions, as policymakers are more prone to refer to it in documents
and Cabinet discussions. If the model holds true, alterations in the views of these
two groups should correspond with policy changes.
49 James C. Robertson, ‘The Origins of British Opposition to Mussolini over Abyssinia’, Journal of
British Studies, 9:1 (1969), p. 127; Avon, Facing the Dictators, p. 302; Middlemas and Barnes,
Baldwin, pp. 871, 899; Parker, ‘Britain, France and the Abyssinian Crisis’, p. 318; Baer, Test Case,
p. 48; D. Watts, Stanley Baldwin and the Search for Consensus (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1996), p. 115; ‘Conference of Ministers’, CAB 23/82, TNA (21 August 1935). See also, Frankel,
‘Towards a Decision-Making Model’, p. 10.
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Parliament played a minor role in policymaking. Although Sir Robert
Vansittart thought the mood to be generally anti-Italian, Parliamentary approval
was unnecessary even for the application of sanctions. Parliament exerted itself
more in opposition to the Hoare-Laval Plan. Opinion initially developed indepen-
dently of public pressure, with former Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain and
other senior figures opposing the agreement. However, Parliament’s support was
not required for the implementation of the Plan, and Foreign Oﬃce documents
rarely refer to Parliament, citing it occasionally as an irritation.50 Backbench
Conservative opinions were more salient. The Abyssinian issue exacerbated
divisions within the Tory Party, with the die-hards opposing any sanctions against
Italy whilst others favoured a particularly hard line. Fifty-nine Conservatives
ultimately signed a motion of disapproval against the plan, and Daniel Waley and
J. A. Cross both argue that the increased hostility towards Hoare in the House of
Commons had more of an impact on the Prime Minister than did public opinion.
However, while this did alarm the Government, it seldom appears in the
documents. Furthermore, the Government’s majority remained solid and, despite
the acknowledged disquiet, Hoare’s Parliamentary Private Secretary thought actual
rebellion unlikely.51
Public opinion was more important. It initially gave conflicting messages to the
Government however, illustrating a potential weakness with models that emphasise
its power. When the people are divided approximately evenly, it becomes far more
diﬃcult to assess the public’s impact. One action is bound to please one side, but
that does not prove causation or even influence. In relation to Abyssinia, the
evidence of pacifism restrained the Government, though its impact should not be
over-stated. The famous pacifist victory in the East Fulham by-election of October
1933 had much to do with specific local circumstances and only Baldwin thought
the result significant. Nevertheless, more than fifty peace organisations existed and
there was little enthusiasm for war. The Cabinet thus opposed requests to mobilise
the army or naval reservists out of fear for the public reaction. They also felt
unable to give France a guarantee against any German reoccupation of the
Rhineland despite the potential advantages to Anglo-French relations. As a
Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcial noted, public support was vital for any war.52
On the other hand, the commitment of the British people to the League was
well-known. Ten million respondents to the Peace Ballot (released on 27 June 1935)
supported economic sanctions against an aggressor – only 635,000 voted against –
50 Marginal note by Vansittart, DBFP, XIV, No. 175 (25 February 1935); Vansittart to Hoare (10 July
1935), quoted in Parker, ‘Britain, France and the Abyssinian Crisis’, p. 298; Hoare to Clerk, BDFA,
XXIX, Doc. 62 (25 October 1935); Daniel Waley, Public Opinion and the Abyssinian War, 1935–6
(London: Temple Smith, 1975), p. 68; James C. Robertson, ‘The Hoare-Laval Plan’, Journal of
Contemporary History, 10:3 (1975), p. 453; minute by Thompson, J 2224/1/1, FO 371/19111, TNA
(5 June 1935).
51 James C. Robertson, ‘The British General Election of 1935’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9:1
(1974), pp. 150, 152; Watts, Stanley Baldwin, p. 113; Waley, Public Opinion, pp. 68–9; Cross, Sir
Samuel Hoare, p. 251; Parker, ‘Britain, France and the Abyssinian Crisis’, p. 323; Patrick to Hoare
(12 December 1935), quoted in Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, p. 250.
52 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, p. 163; D. C. Luckowitz, ‘British Pacifists and Appeasement: The
Peace Pledge Union’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9:1 (1974), p. 115; CC 42 (35) 3, CAB 23/82
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whilst 6.7 million also supported military intervention.53 The strong demand for
British action against Italy was the greatest motivating factor in the Cabinet’s
decision to act. Hoare warned the Cabinet in August that any repudiation of
League commitments would arouse public disquiet and based his sudden support
for the League on political calculation.54 Throughout June, Vansittart repeatedly
warned that the Government’s fall could follow the destruction of the League.
Ultimately, Hoare’s argument that public opinion would desert the Government if
it failed to support the League won over ‘inner’ Cabinet members who expressed
doubts about introducing sanctions.55
The General Election demonstrates the eﬀect of this strand of public opinion
on decision-makers. Whilst aware that war would be unpopular, the Government
was mindful that a weak sanctions policy would have led to accusations of
betraying the League.56 Ministers knew that a tough line against Italy was a vote
winner. The Defence Policy Requirements Sub-Committee was thus keen to avoid
making any announcement about the possibility of détente with Italy until after the
election.57 Leo Amery, a Conservative Cabinet Minister in the 1920s, noted that ‘it
seemed evident the whole thing featured in [Baldwin’s] mind as a useful aid to the
General Election’.58 Although leaflets and speeches show that foreign policy was
not the main issue during the campaign, the Prime Minister often emphasised the
importance of the League.59 In this context, Hoare himself noted that electioneer-
ing in October and November 1935 ‘greatly complicated and hindered any detailed
discussion of the Abyssinian negotiation’.60
This pro-League sentiment ultimately destroyed the Hoare-Laval Plan. Whilst
the Cabinet approved the agreement on 9 December, the proposals were
universally unpopular.61 The liberal establishment and most bishops were horrified.
The public was ‘indignant and ashamed’.62 There is little doubt that all this was
responsible for the Government’s change of heart. Chancellor Neville Chamberlain
told Hoare that he doubted whether the Cabinet could maintain the agreement in
the face of this opposition and at the Cabinet meeting on 18 December, Oliver
Stanley, William Ormsby Gore and Secretary of State for the Colonies J. H.
Thomas all referred to public opinion.63
53 For the complete results of the Peace Ballot, see R. J. Q. Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy
in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–39 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), p. 161.
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These findings illustrate two key points. First, they reaﬃrm the limitations of
Parliament in the sphere of international aﬀairs. The Commons was divided and
unable to wield any real power against the Government on foreign policy for
procedural reasons, though the opposition within the Conservative Party to the
Hoare-Laval Plan did worry the leadership. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates
that the public is interested in major foreign events, and can have real influence
upon them. Indeed, public opinion was the most salient domestic determinant of
British policy. However, it also demonstrates the incoherence of public opinion.
There was little understanding of the extent to which collective security involved
international entanglements.64 The public wanted action against Italy, but, despite
the Peace Ballot, it is questionable how many would have supported armed conflict
with another Great Power over a slave-holding African nation, or would previously
have backed tax rises for armaments. In short, the public wanted to support the
League without paying the price. Ultimately, the anti-Italian sentiment pushed
Britain to act and its influence can be seen clearly from decision-makers’ conduct
during the election campaign. Public opinion was also responsible for the
Government’s rejection of the Hoare-Laval Plan. However, the public was also
unable to support specific policy decisions due to their lack of experience and the
problem of government confidentiality. Thus, while the public played a major role
in forcing Britain to act against Italy and in setting the parameters for her
behaviour, it did not determine the detail of policy.
Psychology, perception and rationality: the international dimension
Policymakers’ perceptions of the international scene were the main determinant of
how they responded. Through scrutiny of the documentary evidence, it is possible
to assess the origins and impact of these perceptions. If based on rational analysis,
perceptions will be justified with reference to reasoned argument. Furthermore, the
emphasis on the most influential decision-makers can be borrowed from the
bureaucratic politics approach. If this model holds, policy outcomes should flow
from their perceptions. Policymakers’ assessments of the relevance of any historical
analogies are the first to be analysed. Views of the League of Nations and Britain’s
role and reputation then need to be examined, but most important were
policymakers’ views of how other states would act. Of these states, the most
significant were Germany, Japan, Italy and especially France.
The use of historical analogy by decision-makers was limited. They correctly
rejected the analogy of the Anglo-Abyssinian clash of 1930. Nevertheless,
Vansittart based the Zeila proposals on the nineteenth century practice of
manipulating borders, whilst the failure of the League over Japan’s invasion of
Manchuria in September 1931 convinced Baldwin of the hopelessness operating
sanctions against a first-class power.65 The most common analogy was the desire
not to repeat the Great War. Personal experience was important here, as Eden,
64 Donald S. Birn, ‘The League of Nations Union and Collective Security’, Journal of Contemporary
History, 9:3 (1974), p. 132.
65 Drummond to Simon, DBFP, XIV, No. 66 (30 December 1934); Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin,
p. 836.
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who saw active service, took a very diﬀerent view from those like Baldwin, Hoare
and Simon, who did not.66 However, this analogy provided little prescription for
action.
Views on the value of the League of Nations did prescribe. Eden was a genuine
League supporter, but found himself in the minority. As Sir Eric Drummond, then
League Secretary-General, wrote in 1931, ‘the great majority [of the Government]
are certainly not League men’.67 Hoare’s resignation speech indicated that a belief
in the League’s weaknesses influenced his thinking that only territorial concessions
could save Abyssinian sovereignty. Duﬀ Cooper, the freshly appointed successor to
Viscount Halifax as Secretary of State for War, was also hostile, as were the service
chiefs. This was especially true of Chatfield, the gifted and influential First Sea
Lord.68 In the Foreign Oﬃce, ministers and oﬃcials regarded the League as just
another tool, with Vansittart preferring ‘the spirit of realism, on which our
existence depends’.69 These views encouraged policymakers to look outside the
League for a solution.
Yet perceptions of Britain’s role and reputation had the opposite eﬀect.
R. I. Campbell wrote that any action undertaken with only France as an ally
would damage Britain’s reputation. Moreover, the failure to act against Japan over
Manchuria increased the pressure to resist Italy and many in the Cabinet feared
that imposing an unjust settlement on Abyssinia would, in Eden’s words, ‘rob us
of our good name’.70 William Ormsby Gore, First Commissioner of Works but
whose views on colonial matters Baldwin respected, stressed the potential imperial
implications of such a blow to British prestige, whilst Halifax, an old friend of
Baldwin who had recently become Lord Privy Seal, emphasised the Hoare-Laval
Plan’s danger to the moral standing of the Government and the Prime Minister
personally.71 This was bound to influence Baldwin, who took pride in his
trustworthy, ‘man of the people’ image.
Policymakers’ perceptions combined with rational assessments of how they
thought other states would act played the decisive part in their decision-making.
The belief that US oil would continue to reach Italy rendered a complete embargo
out of the question.72 However, the most salient perceptions related to British
security. The widely held belief that Japan posed a danger to British interests had
a significant impact. Baldwin’s later comment that he could not put the League
ahead of the Empire illustrates the weight he attributed to the Japanese factor,
whilst the service ministries and the Treasury were especially keen to come to an
agreement with Japan.73 Friendship with Italy was essential to Britain’s position in
the Far East, not least because passage through the Mediterranean was necessary
to ensure supply lines.
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Whilst Japan threatened the Empire, an aggressive Germany could menace
Europe and the British mainland. Indeed, Paul Doerr goes so far as to argue that
‘Fear of Germany was the decisive determinant in British policy during the
Ethiopian crisis’.74 The report from Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador at Berlin,
on the accelerating German rearmament, which he thought would precede
territorial expansion, epitomised British concerns. Compared to this, he said, the
Abyssinian issue was ‘mere child’s play’.75 Similarly, Eden, Hoare, Chamberlain
and Simon all prioritised European security.76 Two fears were paramount. The first
was that Italian action against Abyssinia would weaken Italy, thereby threatening
the balance of power and leaving Austria more vulnerable to Germany.77
Mussolini opposed the extension of German influence to Italy’s northern frontier
– hoping instead to install a pro-Italian fascist government in Vienna – and
responded to an abortive coup by Austrian Nazis in July 1934 with a show of force
on the border.78 More influential, however, was the view that British opposition to
Mussolini would push him into the arms of German leader Adolf Hitler. This idea
particularly animated Vansittart, and Hoare later justified the Paris plan with
reference to it.79
Those within the Cabinet ‘who wanted to preserve Italian friendship at almost
any cost’ therefore opposed Eden.80 Simon preferred Italy to the League and feared
the rise of Communism in the country should Mussolini fall. Although lower
oﬃcials in the Foreign Oﬃce seemed to share Eden’s view, Vansittart, again
contradicting the bureaucratic politics perspective, did not.81 Whichever side they
took however, few saw any possible gains from a conflict with Italy, even a
successful one. Most of all, the Cabinet feared a surprise Italian attack against the
British position in the eastern Mediterranean. Egypt, ‘a jugular vein of imperial
communications’, and Malta were subjects of particular concern.82 State-
sanctioned Italian press attacks on Britain motivated her partial naval mobilisation
in September (cessation of these attacks was made a condition of détente) and an
anxious Vansittart passed to the service chiefs Drummond’s warnings from Rome
that sanctions could precipitate such an attack. The First Lord of the Admiralty
and others referred to intelligence reports that Italy planned to attack Britain.83 In
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short, the Government was aware that Mussolini would see an oil sanction as an
act of war and Vansittart thus opposed it.84
Even though the Chiefs of Staﬀ, Chatfield and Eden were confident of victory
over Italy, there was widespread concern about Britain’s preparedness for war.85
Italy had more submarines and a strong air force. At the Admiralty, Chatfield and
Eyres-Monsell were particularly worried about the inadequacy of Britain’s air
defences. Vansittart pressed that Britain could not aﬀord to lose any ships and the
Chiefs of Staﬀ advised against a naval war with Italy.86 Hoare attributed all
Britain’s failures to her military weakness, claiming that ‘there was no eﬀective
support for our foreign policy’, but even Baldwin thought his fear of war
excessive.87 Nevertheless, several Cabinet ministers noted Britain’s military weak-
ness in August 1935. A Foreign Oﬃce oﬃcial also identified Britain’s military
weakness as one of two key factors that influenced Hoare in making his agreement
with Laval. The second was the French position.88
Given the potential threat from Germany and Italy, along with Britain’s lack
of preparedness, ‘The Government concluded that everything depended on the
attitude of France’.89 Baldwin conveyed to the Cabinet the importance of French
support on 24 September.90 For the French, however, of paramount importance
was the maintenance of the Stresa Front (of April 1935), an agreement between
themselves, Britain and Italy to resist German rearmament. France even initially
refused to guarantee to aid Britain against an Italian attack, though FO oﬃcials
still believed that France would choose Britain over Italy if necessary.91 On
sanctions, the French attitude was decisive. Having determined to impose sanctions
on 9 October, the Cabinet decided five days later to postpone them until her ally’s
position was clear. They also decided not to exceed economic measures for the
same reason.92
These findings suggest that perception and rationality proceeded in tandem.
Decision-makers perceived certain actors to pose a threat to British interests, but
this was born more from rational analysis. There was no evidence of groupthink
and historical analogy played a very small part in British foreign policymaking, as
there were few relevant analogies from which to choose. The impact of perceptions
based on personal experience and beliefs was also limited. Most decision-makers
shared perceptions of the League, and Britain’s role and reputation, but these
‘Origins of British Opposition’, p. 142; Drummond to Hoare, BDFA, XXIX, Doc. 64 (30 October
1935); Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 851; Parker, ‘Britain, France and the Abyssinian Crisis’,
p. 312; Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare, p. 238.
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produced contradictory impulses. Whilst unenthusiastic about the League, many
felt obliged to support it to protect the Government’s good name. Perceptions of
how other states would act, formed largely by rational analysis, dominated. This
is evident in the decision on oil sanctions, and in the influence of the fears of
Japanese, German and Italian intentions, which provided the context. These
perceptions counselled against strong action against Italy and coalesced with
worries about Britain’s military weakness. Perceptions of how France would act
therefore became central to British decision-making. In her dispirited state, Britain
had no wish to risk war or a weakening of her position without French support.
Thus, reasoned judgement, as described by Hollis and Smith, took place without
belief systems having a major noticeable eﬀect.
This all questions Jervis’s work when applied to a crisis situation. In such
situations, policymakers are able to focus specifically on a particular issue. This
was especially the case in relation to Abyssinia because the tension built up
gradually. Views of security dominated and the fact that the fundamental goal, to
uphold British security, was clear aided reasoned judgement. The evidence clearly
shows that this consideration was paramount in the minds of most decision-
makers. However, rational analysis does not guarantee correct perceptions.
Misperception can still occur, but perceptions based as much as possible on
rational analysis are more likely to be accurate than those predominantly grounded
in values and beliefs.
Conclusion
Addis Ababa fell on 5 May 1936. The discredited League swiftly rescinded the
sanctions previously imposed on Italy, whilst British and French policymakers
looked with increasing anxiety at Germany following the remilitarisation of the
Rhineland in March. A number of factors influenced the British response to the
Italian action. Bureaucratic politics did exist in the Government during the
Abyssinian Crisis, but made little diﬀerence to policymaking. Oﬃce holders’
personalities and views were more influential. More important still was domestic
politics. The Government was concerned about backbench MPs, but attached
greater significance to public opinion. With an election approaching, it was public
sentiment that motivated the Government to support the League in a quarrel that
had only limited relevance to British interests. The Cabinet sought to ‘appease’
Italy with the Hoare-Laval Plan once the election was over, but the public outcry
prevented this. Public opinion thus pushed the Government to act. The perceptions
of decision-makers inclined in the opposite direction. These views influenced the
way in which Britain responded. Psychological influences were minimal and
contradictory. Instead, judgements on how rival powers would act predominated.
Decision-makers saw Japan and Germany as threats and this, alongside their belief
in British weakness, made them reluctant to act against Italy, and insistent on
French support if they had to. British policy resulted from the interaction between
the public’s desire for action against Italy and the wish of the majority of the
Cabinet and senior oﬃcials to minimise the damage to Anglo-Italian and
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Anglo-French relations. This is contrary to A. J. P. Taylor’s contention that British
decision-makers ‘did not know’ why they acted as they did.
These findings provide an insight into the relative merits of the main FPA
theories. The bureaucratic politics model is the least applicable. The Abyssinian
case study highlights three of its shortcomings. First, it illustrates the problems of
applying the model to the British policymaking system. The model holds that the
preferences and operating procedures of individual departments influence out-
comes, but the Foreign Oﬃce stood largely unchallenged in the making of foreign
policy during the crisis. The Treasury set some limits by restricting expenditure, but
had little influence beyond this. This left much less scope for departmental
bargaining. It also shows that, as already mentioned, bureaucratic politics made
little diﬀerence to outcomes even where it did exist. While these findings correlate
with a convincing article by Edward Rhodes, the third relates specifically to
crises.93 Because the Abyssinian issue was so important, the Government dealt with
it at the highest levels. Existing organisational procedures ceased to be relevant,
raising questions about the appropriateness of Allison’s models to crises.
Domestic politics can have a major impact on foreign policy. This conclusion
comes with three qualifications however, which those who argue for the primacy
of domestic politics must address. First, the General Election increased the
importance of public opinion markedly, and the fact that election pledges were still
ringing in the electorate’s ears influenced the rejection of the Hoare-Laval Plan. A
Government halfway through its term could have reacted diﬀerently. Moreover,
the Abyssinian Crisis commanded great public attention. The influence of the
public is likely to be much less in more routine matters, in which are less interested.
Finally, even when this interest was clear, it was contradictory and at most limited
to making rather vague demands about outcomes. The public may articulate goals,
but rarely will they instruct on reaching them.
This falls to decision-makers to resolve. The evidence presented suggests that in
a crisis situation, decision-makers concern themselves with maximising the interests
of their state more than personal ambition. Perceptions of how other states would
act were uppermost in minds of decision-makers, but rational analysis more than
personal experience or psychological factors formed these. This would further
suggest that the rational actor model, despite its simplicity, retains strong
explanatory power in a prolonged crisis. This is probably because decision-makers
focus on the issue and have time to weigh up options. Greater convergence
between the rational actor and psychological approaches is therefore required,
along with further study of the conditions under which misperception is most likely
to occur. Given the diﬀerences between states’ systems and cultures, between values
and circumstances over time, this is likely to vary. Thus, each foreign policy
analysis approach provides insights into the Abyssinian case, but is insuﬃcient
alone to explain British policymaking. The greatest benefits are found in combining
them.
93 See Rhodes, ‘Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?’
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